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Summary: Twelve years after the discussions on development and institutions at the meeting of  the Geographischer Arbeits-
kreis Entwicklungstheorien (GAE 2000) in Zürich, this paper seeks to put institutions back on the research agenda in develop-
ment geography. The authors explore recent trends in institutional theory and propose a dialectic understanding of  “doing 
institutions” that positions social actors and their everyday practices at the center of  institutional analysis. Institutions are 
the socially (re-)produced rules that enable, constrain and give meaning to the social practices of  actors. Actors make insti-
tutions; at the same time institutions make actors do certain things. Based on this foundation, three central aspects of  the 
institutional debate are elaborated: Institutional plurality, the legitimacy of  institutions, and the role of  the state. Two case 
studies from recent research in South Asia illustrate aspects of  the conceptual considerations. The article ends with an out-
look on the implications of  “doing institutions” for future research in development geography.
Zusammenfassung: Zwölf  Jahre nachdem das Verhältnis zwischen Entwicklung und Institutionen beim Geographischen 
Arbeitskreis Entwicklungstheorien (GAE 2000) in Zürich debattiert wurde, ist es Ziel dieses Beitrags, das Thema Instituti-
onen wieder auf  die Agenda geographischer Entwicklungsforschung zu setzen. Verschiedene Institutionentheorien werden 
beleuchtet, um ein dialektisches Verständnis des „Institutionen-Machens“ zu entwickeln, in dem soziale Akteure und ihre 
alltäglichen Praktiken im Zentrum der Analyse stehen. Menschen machen Institutionen und gleichzeitig strukturieren Insti-
tutionen menschliches Handeln. Wir definieren Institutionen daher als sozial (re)produzierte Regeln, welche die alltäglichen 
Praktiken von Akteuren ermöglichen, beschränken und ihnen eine Bedeutung zuweisen. Drei zentrale Aspekte der Instituti-
onendebatte werden aufgeworfen: die Pluralität von institutionellen Regelungen, die Legitimität von Institutionen sowie die 
Rolle des Staates. Das entwickelte Verständnis von Institutionen und sozialer Praxis wird anhand von zwei Fallstudien aus 
Südasien illustriert. Der Beitrag schließt mit einem Ausblick auf  mögliche zukünftige Forschungsfelder der Geographischen 
Entwicklungsforschung.
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1 Introduction: The institutional debate in 
development geography
It goes without saying that laws, rules, social 
norms, values and shared cognitive systems are 
fundamental aspects of human behavior. But sur-
prisingly, institutional theory that concentrates on 
these issues plays only a shadowy existence in the 
conceptual discussions in human geography. The 
standard German geography textbook (GeBhardt 
et al. 2011), for instance, hardly mentions the term 
institutions and disregards institutional theory 
completely. While it is quite common to borrow key 
concepts from the adjoining social sciences, such as 
social systems, agency, interactions or discourses, 
the explicit study of institutions has received very 
little attention in German-speaking social geogra-
phy (cf. Weichhart 2008, 333). Of all geographical 
sub-disciplines, the study of institutions is probably 
most firmly established in economic geography (cf. 
SchamP 2000; Bathelt and Glückler 2003), where 
the scholars from the new institutional economics 
(cf. WilliamSon 1975; North 1990) were acknowl-
edged. Despite this, numerous human geographers 
have continuously carried out research on and about 
institutions in recent decades. And yet, their em-
pirical studies have rarely focused on institutions 
as such, but implicitly pointed to the importance 
of analyzing institutions in order to understand the 
social world.
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In development geography, research on institu-
tions is grounded in the famous work of amartya 
Sen (1981) on food entitlements. Sen perceived in-
stitutions as mostly state-set rules that effectively 
grant – or deny – actors’ access to needed resourc-
es, such as food, finances or services. Sen pointed 
out that entitlement failure is an important fac-
tor explaining hunger and famine (cf. WattS and 
Bohle 1993). At the meeting of the Geographischer 
Arbeitskreis Entwicklungstheorien (GAE) 2000 in 
Zürich (see special issue of Geographica Helvetica 
edited by Müller-Böker 2001), implications of 
institutional theory for research in development 
geography were discussed with an explicit focus 
on new institutional economics (NIE). Based on 
the work of douGlaSS north (1990, 3), institu-
tions were defined as the “rules of the game in a 
society, or, more formally [...] the humanly devised 
constrains that shape human action”. Compared to 
Sen, north broadened the understanding of in-
stitutions by incorporating informal rules, such as 
norms, habits, attitudes and beliefs into his concep-
tualization, which provided some common ground 
for works in development geography (harriSS et al. 
1995; leach et al. 1999; Büttner 2001; coy 2001; 
müller-Böker 2001; Thomi 2001; krüGer 2003; 
de haan and zoomerS 2005; FünFGeld 2007; 
noe 2007d; etzold et al. 2009). 
Twelve years after the meeting of the GAE, we 
would like to take up the debate again and put insti-
tutions back on the agenda. Inspired by sociologi-
cal neo-institutionalism (Kneer 2008; Scott 2008; 
WalGenBach and Meyer 2008), we would like to 
highlight the complex dynamics of institutions and 
their assertiveness and, more generally, the am-
bivalent processes of ordering societies. as kneer 
(2008, 125ff.) puts it, institutions are permanently 
formed, sustained and re-negotiated in the tension 
between the ordered and the unordered. From such 
a perspective, there is a need for elaborating an ac-
tor-oriented understanding of institutions, which 
is the central aim of this article. We define insti-
tutions and discuss the dialectic relation of actors’ 
practices and institutions. On this basis we elabo-
rate three major implications of our understanding 
of “doing institutions”: Institutional plurality and 
the notion of institutional bricolage, the question 
of the legitimacy of institutions, and the role of 
the state. Two case studies from our research in 
South Asia help to further illustrate our considera-
tions. The article ends with suggestions for future 
emphasis in institutional research in development 
geography.
2 The three pillars of  institutions
Broadly speaking, the institutional debate in the 
social sciences oscillates between a narrow under-
standing of institutions as “rules for action which 
are decisive, binding and permanent” (SenGe and 
Hellmann 2006, 44) and much wider concep-
tualizations of institutions as habitualized social 
practices. Our actor-oriented understanding of in-
stitutions has been largely informed by the social 
theories of anthony GiddenS (1984) and Pierre 
Bourdieu (1998), by sociological neo-institutional-
ism (cf. Scott 2008), as well as by cleaver’s (2002) 
concept of institutional bricolage. We define insti-
tutions as permanently socially (re-)produced rules 
that enable, constrain, and give meaning to social 
practices and that comprise regulative, normative, 
and cultural-cognitive elements (cf. GiddenS 1984; 
Searle 1995; HaSSe and Krücken 2005; Florian 
2006; Scott 2008).
Three major institutional pillars were analytical-
ly distinguished by Scott (2008, 48ff.). Institutions 
in a first and narrow sense comprise sets of more or 
less codified rules, decision-making procedures, and 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms that to-
gether guide human conduct. Such an understand-
ing of institutions centers on the notion of “regula-
tive rules” (Scott 2008, 52).
As addressed by Scott’s second pillar, institu-
tions also constitute normative systems: “Values are 
conceptions of the preferred or the desirable [...]. 
Norms specify how things should be done; they de-
fine legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Scott 
2008, 54f.). Together values and norms help to de-
fine the objectives of actors and the appropriate 
ways to achieve them. Moreover, norms decide upon 
actors’ social roles, their obligations and privileges 
(Scott 2008, 55), and their power position in vari-
ous “fields” of society (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992).
Scott’s (2008) third pillar, the “cultural-cogni-
tive” element of institutions, works at the deepest 
level of society. While human cognition mediates 
between the external world and actors’ symbolic 
representations of and ascription to it, the very ele-
ments of representations – symbols such as words, 
signs or gestures – are socially constructed. As “con-
stitutive rules” (Searle 1995, 43ff.), these symbolic 
systems help actors to break down the reality into 
comprehensible categories, which make sense and 
which can then be translated into appropriate social 
practices. These deeply embedded cultural “frames” 
(cf. GoFFman 1974) are collectively shared in a so-
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cial group and most often simply taken for granted. 
Inadvertently, they shape the meaning that actors 
assign to objects, practices and places as well as to 
their own identities. Capturing this cultural-cogni-
tive dimension of institutions requires the inclusion 
of emotional facts such as confusion and disorienta-
tion or confidence and certitude into institutional 
analysis (Scott 2008, 59).
3 “Doing institutions” – a dialectic relation 
of  institutions and social practices
The fact that institutions typically portray a high 
degree of invariance over a long time and usually out-
last the life span of individuals provided social scien-
tists a reason for choosing institutions rather than in-
dividuals as basic research units (GiddenS 1984, 61). 
Nevertheless, a pure focus on institutions bears the 
risk of getting trapped in an extreme form of cultural 
or structural determinism (hodGSon 1998, 181). The 
“methodological individualism”, in turn, focuses on 
atomized actors as research units that are treated as 
taken for granted. The single focus on individuals, 
however, bears the risk of an exposed voluntarism 
(Bathelt and Glückler 2003, 24). Just as institu-
tions cannot be adequately explained by looking at 
the behavior of individuals, their conduct cannot be 
explained only through an institutional lens. Instead, 
both actors’ practices and institutions have to be 
conceptualized in an interrelated manner (hodGSon 
1998, 176). Institutions are dead unless they are con-
tinually “brought to life” (BerGer and luckmann 
1967, 75) by actors. Similarly, actors, their manifold 
social roles and their practices in the course of every-
day life are themselves realizations of broader institu-
tions (GiddenS 1984, 25).
Given the interrelation between institutions 
and actors, how can social practices be conceptual-
ized? With meyer et al. (1987, 13), human conduct 
is nothing but actors’ “enactment of broad institu-
tional scripts”. Nevertheless, actors do not follow 
such scripts in a blind manner, but have a potential to 
choose between a multitude of such scripts. jePPerSon 
(1991, 148) puts it that way: “[O]ne enacts institutions; 
one takes action by departing from them, not by par-
ticipating in them”. However, it goes without ques-
tion that actors can never reach a space that is free 
of institutions. In fact, actors are able to choose from 
alternatives and to intervene into the state of affairs 
not despite of but because they are institutionally 
embedded (WalGenBach and meyer 2008, 121). At 
the same time, they find themselves involved in so-
cial spaces that are constituted by broad sets of rules, 
norms, obligations and meanings that need to be re-
interpreted constantly. This interpretation, which re-
lies on actors’ skills and knowledge, or in Bourdieu’s 
(1998) words their capital and habitus, is a genuine 
activity inasmuch as each situation must be defined 
in a way that makes a specific institution viable and 
proper (WalGenBach and meyer 2008, 174). 
We define social practices as routines and strat-
egies that are socially embedded, contingent and 
meaningful and thus structured by institutions 
(Bourdieu 1998; Florian 2006; evertS et al. 2011). 
In turn, actors interpret and navigate through exist-
ing societal orderings and thereby reproduce some, 
but never all prevalent institutions that are “in place”. 
Social practices thus (re)structure institutions. We 
therefore speak of “doing institutions” in order to 
highlight the dialectic relation between institutions 
and social practices: Institutions are a medium and 
outcome of social practices, while social practices 
are a medium and outcome of institutions. We argue 
that such a dialectic interpretation helps us to handle 
the messiness and fussiness of social reality that we 
encounter in everyday life (not only) in the Global 
South.
4 Conceptual implications of  “doing institu-
tions”
The dialectic understanding of institutions and 
social practices that underlies our idea of “doing in-
stitutions” has further conceptual implications. In 
the following section we will highlight three crucial 
aspects of “doing institutions” to be considered for 
further discussion: Institutional plurality, the legiti-











Fig. 1: Relation between actors and institutions. Source: 
draft KecK 2012, based on Hodgson 1998; giddens 1984
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4.1 Institutional plurality, coexistence and brico-
lage
In the New Institutional Economics, a plural-
ity of institutional orders has been largely discussed 
on the basis of the distinction between formal and 
informal institutions. According to north (1990, 
43ff.), formal institutions comprise codified and writ-
ten rules, directives and contracts that are outlined 
in constitutions, laws, company directives or con-
tracts. In contrast, informal institutions subsume 
cultural norms, customs and routines. While the 
former stresses Scott’s regulative pillar, the latter 
emphasizes the normative and cultural-cognitive 
one. Pluralism in form of the formality-informality 
nexus is often conceptualized as the parallel existence 
of two sets of rules guiding actors’ conduct. The dis-
tinction between formal and informal regulation of 
employment relations, services, markets or space is a 
case in point (cf. Revilla Diez et al. 2008; etzold et 
al. 2009; hoSSain 2011; keck 2012; keck et al. 2012).
Institutional plurality is often considered as 
problematic and dysfunctional because of the po-
tential uncertainties, injustices and conflicts that 
result from their ambiguity (cf. NeuBurGer 2001; 
KrüGer 2003; YounG et al. 2005). An understand-
ing of institutions that focuses on actors and their 
agency facilitates a more elaborated view on insti-
tutional plurality. WeStermann (2007, 66) draws 
attention to the ability of actors to consciously 
choose between those coexisting legal and nor-
mative institutions that help them to pursue their 
goals. cleaver’s (2002) concept of “institutional 
bricolage” goes even one step further. Bricolage 
involves an active assemblage of existing rules, 
norms, and values by the bricoleur to suit new pur-
poses. Bricoleurs can not only play with coexist-
ing institutions, but actively transfer, creatively re-
assemble and purposely re-design them. As some 
bricoleurs possess more resources and social power 
than others, bricolage is a distinctively authoritative 
process. Actors with different attributes (resources, 
power, identities, interests, etc.) are thus likely to 
apply their agency in differing ways, which in turn 
results in a rich diversity of institutional arrange-
ments, and which creates opportunities and spaces 
for negotiation (cleaver 2002, 28). However, the 
power to creatively reassemble institutional settings 
is highly unequally distributed within a society 
(cleaver 2000, 2007). For the majority of actors – 
particularly the subordinate – the constraining ele-
ments of institutions are much stronger than their 
power to reshape them.
4.2 The legitimacy and assertiveness of  institu-
tions
It is important not to limit institutional anal-
yses to the “problem of interplay” (younG et al. 
2005, 60ff.) between a plurality of coexisting insti-
tutions with possibly different functions, but rather 
to extend it towards the ways in which institutions 
are advocated, legitimized and enforced, and thus 
“brought to life” (BerGer and luckmann 1967, 75) 
through social practices. The first crucial aspect is 
then the legitimacy of institutions, which are often 
simultaneously “in place”, but put “into effect” to a 
very different degree (cf. Etzold et al. 2009).
Legitimacy is understood as a symbolic value 
that can be obtained by individual actors or or-
ganizations, and which is measured in the degree 
of approval, consent and support by others. The 
legitimacy and assertiveness of institutions does 
not merely depend on coercion, but largely rests 
on how rules are underscored by social norms and 
how they are framed by underlying cognitive sys-
tems. Each of Scott’s (2008, 48) three pillars of 
institutions (regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive), therefore provide a distinct basis for 
legitimacy, but each is insufficient, if standing 
alone: Conformity with legal rules and other for-
mal directives only makes sense if these rules are 
underpinned by internalized norms and values, 
which provide “a deeper, moral base assessing le-
gitimacy” (Scott 2008, 61). In cultural-cognitive 
terms, legitimacy stems from a common defini-
tion of a situation or a shared understanding of 
actors’ social roles (ibid.).
As indicated, institutions require constant re-
cognition, re-affirmation, re-investment and re-
negotiation in order to persist. On the one hand, 
they require actors and organizations that put 
them in effect and enforce them, and who con-
trol and possibly sanction other actors’ conduct. 
The legitimacy of an institution thus largely de-
pends on the legitimacy of its advocating actors. 
The basis of actors’ legitimacy is the possession 
of authoritative resources such as wealth, spe-
cialist knowledge, an official position, personal 
characteristics like eloquence or honesty, and 
most importantly social recognition and prestige 
(Bourdieu 1998, 108; Cleaver 2002, 19). On the 
other hand, institutions require actors who be-
lieve in them, and who judge them as relevant, ap-
propriate, practicable, durable and fair (Florian 
2006, 85; Scott 2008, 59f.). Dominant sets of 
institutions are often perceived as self-evident, 
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natural, inevitable or indisputable, in particular 
by those actors with little power to change them 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 98; Scott 2008, 
58). As actors internalize dominant norms, values 
and beliefs into their own perceptions, expecta-
tions and aptitudes, most actors act in accordance 
with dominant institutions and do not question 
their legitimacy.
4.3 Institutions and the everyday state
Institutions distribute power among social 
groups (cf. Hall and Taylor 1996). It is self-ev-
ident then that the relation between institutions 
and the nation state needs to be addressed too. 
The relations between institutions and the state 
are mostly discussed with regard to the “regulative 
pillar” of Scott’s institutional trinity. The state is 
considered as the major rule-making actor and it is 
assumed that it behaves in a neutral way in enforc-
ing them (Bourdieu 1998, 35ff.; leach et al. 1999, 
238). Deviations from state sanctioned institutions 
are considered as exceptions and failures (Cleaver 
2002, 14). However, the role of the state at a norma-
tive and especially cultural-cognitive level should 
not be overlooked. As Bourdieu (1998, 2006) 
points out, the concentration of symbolic capital, 
i.e., any attribute that is valued by actors, has a sig-
nificant role for the state. By monopolizing sym-
bolic capital, the state has the authority to judge 
what can be, and what has a legal right to exist. The 
power of the state enables it to define specific cat-
egories of persons, to set the rules and regulations 
applying to them, and to teach this way of thinking 
to its citizens and the state representatives.
What does our notion of “doing institutions” 
mean for the relationship between the state and 
institutions? While the state plays a major role in 
creating institutions through its apparatuses, it is 
important to note that the state never speaks with 
one voice alone. Quite contrastingly, looking at in-
stitutions as a plurality of shifting rules, norms and 
cognitive patterns sheds light upon the fact that 
state regulations are all but alone in shaping human 
behavior (leach et al. 1999, 237; zimmer 2012, 
254). As individual bricoleurs, state actors may cre-
ate other sets of institutions in their sphere of in-
fluence, or reinterpret and selectively enforce for-
mal institutions for their own purposes (Cleaver 
2002; Bourdieu 2006). Fuller and Bénéï (2001) 
have been looking into this problem under the 
label of the “everyday state”. Based on their con-
cept, CorBridGe et al. (2005, 5) suggest that the 
routine state is made up of “everyday institutions”. 
Government actors and their behavior are thus 
embedded in two ways: On the one hand, they are 
integrated into their administrative hierarchy and 
political networks; on the other hand, they also be-
long to a specific local society (Cleaver 2002, 17; 
CorBridGe et al. 2005, 152). What state representa-
tives actually do therefore does not necessarily refer 
to any formal regulations, but rather to institutions 
built on daily routines (BraSS 1997, 279; Cleaver 
2002, 16; Coelho 2005, 179; etzold 2012). The 
way institutions are created and put into practice 
by “the” state can hence shift from one situation 
to another (Kneer 2008, 129). In this situation 
of overlap and complexity, everyday rules, norms 
and cognitive patterns are “constantly negotiated, 
contested and struggled over” (Bohle et al. 2009, 
54). By focusing on individual actors and their 
interactions, these negotiation processes become 
visible. The state, understood as an everyday state, 
becomes something people maintain intimate, per-
sonal relationships with (OSella and OSella 2001, 
157). Looking at the social relations between state 
representatives and citizens is therefore one crucial 
element of institutional analysis.
5 “Doing institutions” in development geog-
raphy – case studies from South Asia
Empirical research in development geography 
seeks to understand and explain complex social 
transformation processes and how they manifest 
themselves in social structures, in space and in the 
lives of people – mainly but not only – in the coun-
tries of the Global South (cf. Bohle 2011; Müller-
Mahn and Verne 2010). One of the research foci 
is to comprehend the multiple vulnerabilities of 
marginalized social groups, whose access to vital 
resources is endangered and contested (cf. Bohle 
2005; de Haan and ZoomerS 2005). Our concept 
of “doing institutions” serves this aim by looking at 
power relations and the institutional orders in are-
nas, which are social and thus institutionalized spac-
es that are realized in physical space (cf. Etzold et al. 
2009; SakdaPolrak 2010; keck 2012). In these are-
nas, the access to space, the access to resources and 
the access to power is often highly contested, forcing 
the vulnerable to play out their adaptive capacities in 
order to sustain their livelihoods. Two case studies 
from our empirical research in South Asia will help 
to illustrate this approach.
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5.1 Case study 1: Slums as arenas of  struggle in 
Delhi, India
The case study from Delhi, India, illustrates how 
the megacity’s slums are subject to shifting rules, val-
ues and cognitive patterns, which decisively struc-
ture their existence, their legal status and the future 
prospects of slum residents.1) The sheer existence of 
slums already points to several competing institu-
tions within as well as outside the state apparatus. 
Slums are defined by a majority within the state as 
illegal encroachments and a whole set of formal rules 
is supposed to ensure their disappearance and pre-
vent their re-appearance (duPont and ramanathan 
2008; Ghertner 2010). Moreover, slums are de-
picted as temporary settlements, although they of-
ten are the homes of generations of urban citizens. 
Therefore, moral norms are mobilized in order to de-
clare slums as unacceptable areas which are “unfit for 
human habitation” (The Slum Areas (Improvement 
and Clearance) Act, Government of India 1956). Yet, 
several rules, norms and cognitive patterns act in fa-
vor of the persistence of slums in India. Academia as 
well as activists argue that slums are “here to stay”, 
thereby trying to influence people’s perceptions 
about these settlements. Moral norms of “assistance 
to the poor” and “guilt of the rich”, who want cheap 
servant labor in their homes but do not provide suf-
ficient affordable housing options in the vicinity, im-
ply a necessary tolerance of slums. Moreover, slum 
inhabitants are very often issued voter cards so that 
their political representatives (benefiting from the 
extra vote bank) feel obliged to assist (zimmer 2009).
The plurality of institutions applying to slums is 
even reflected in the formal rules and the way they 
are interpreted by state representatives themselves. 
Politicians in Delhi cite the Municipal Corporations’ 
Act to justify why they are providing slums with ba-
sic facilities and decry that the government is not fol-
lowing its own rules. The administration, in turn, tol-
erates that politicians provide infrastructure for their 
voters in slums through the backdoor: Politicians 
formally apply for the execution of infrastructure im-
provements through their funds, but omit where ex-
actly in their constituency those improvements will 
be done. This way, formal permission is achieved to 
use their funds in slum areas, too. But what is seen 
1) The research project on waste water governance in 
Delhi’s slums and unauthorised colonies was conducted by 
anna zimmer from 2007–2011 under supervision of Prof. 
h.-G. Bohle (University of Bonn). The project was funded 
by the Heinrich-Boell-Foundation.
as democratic accountability by some is decried as il-
legal and corrupt by those objecting slums. In order 
to abolish slums, actors within and outside the state 
have created new cognitive patterns, such as the im-
age of Delhi as a world-class city (jerviS read 2010), 
and new moral norms that are more coherent with 
the bourgeois environmentalism of Delhi’s middle 
classes (BaviSkar 2003; Ghertner 2010). As a con-
sequence, new rules are created through court judg-
ments that even declare the provision of resettlement 
plots to be like “giving a reward to a pickpocket” 
(DuPont and Ramanathan 2008, 329).
The contestations of slums in Delhi are thus 
manifold and the outcomes very fragmented. While 
some slums are being demolished without much 
ado, in others slum dwellers get access to electric-
ity, water and sewage systems and manage to hold 
on to the land for decades. Other slums are awarded 
the status of “listed”, but facilities do not follow. Or 
water pipes are installed, but without guarantee of 
water flowing in them (Anand 2011). The institu-
tional reality regarding the existence of slums and 
the provision of public services in them can thus not 
be described by a fixed set of formal institutions that 
apply to them, but rather by the successes or failures 
of state and non-state actors in navigating through 
the multiplicity of institutions and benefiting from 
or being excluded through the gaps between them.
5.2 Case study 2: Contested public spaces in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh
The case study on street food vending in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, questions the practicability of formal in-
stitutions in street food vending and illustrates how 
regulators of public spaces are playing with the im-
plementation of formal rules.2) Street food vending 
is omnipresent in Dhaka and plays a crucial role for 
the urban food supply. It is estimated that around 
95,000 street food vendors appropriate public spaces 
in order to provide their services to the urban popu-
lation and to sustain their own livelihoods (keck et 
al. 2008; etzold et al. 2009). Access to urban public 
space is thus a crucial livelihood resource for the ur-
2) The study of street food vending conducted by Benjamin 
etzold was part of a research project on the “Megaurban Food 
System of Dhaka” (2007–2010) led by Prof. Bohle (University 
of Bonn) and Dr. zinGel (University of Heidelberg, South Asia 
Institute) within the German Research Foundation’s programme 
“Megacities-Megachallenge: Informal Dynamics of Global 
Change” (SPP 1233). 
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ban poor (hackenBroch et al. 2009; etzold 2011). 
But the magnitude of street food vending stands in 
stark contrast to the regulative rules of the state over 
the use of Dhaka’s public spaces. While the unli-
censed sale of prepared food in public places is pro-
hibited by law (Dhaka City Corporation Ordinance 
1983), it is in fact impossible to obtain a formal li-
cense for selling food on Dhaka’s streets. As virtual-
ly none are registered, all street vendors encroach on 
public spaces illegally. But why then has street food 
vending been largely tolerated by Dhaka’s authorities 
for decades? The existence of street food vending 
highlights a situation, in which not all actors have 
internalized the existing regulative rules. Although 
the city’s elite normatively labels street food vend-
ing as unhygienic, backward and an illicit aspect of 
urban life, the logic of the strict prohibition of street 
food vending does not make sense to most of the city 
dwellers. The formal rules on street vending are thus 
not seen as legitimate and followed only if state rep-
resentatives such as police or guards are present and 
use coercive means to enforce them (etzold 2012).
Moreover, state actors are not solely part of the 
state apparatus that ought to enforce the formal 
regulatory framework. They are socially embed-
ded actors and involved in the very local “politics 
of the street” (Bayat 1997). The regulation of the 
public space in front of Dhaka’s Medical College 
Hospital through a security guard illustrates the 
implication of actors’ multiple embeddedness: The 
main duty of the guard is to check the entrance of 
patients, their relatives and medical clerks, and to 
keep the entry gates of the hospital clear of street 
vendors. An interview with one of the guards re-
vealed that he feels that he has to handle the street 
vendors flexibly. During the daytime when his supe-
riors, in particular the director, are present he ful-
fills his duties more thoroughly. In the evening, in 
contrast, when his superiors have left the scene, he 
asserts that the vendors do not create any problems 
and largely tolerates their vending activities right at 
the hospital’s main gate (etzold et al. 2009). He 
legitimizes his own deviant behavior from his for-
mal role by referring to the street vendors as poor 
city dwellers who need to sustain their livelihoods 
somehow. Whenever he can, he turns a blind eye to 
the street vendors not only because of strong social 
norms that imply responsibility towards the urban 
poor, but also because he, being a public employee 
at the bottom of the state hierarchy, largely shares 
with them the same life world and value system. It 
is therefore easy for him to imagine their precarious 
situation.
This example shows that we can only understand 
the different spatial and temporal patterns of the use 
of public spaces in Dhaka, if we analyze the real ef-
fects of institutions as they are implemented and ex-
perienced on the ground. In this regard, discerning 
the ways in which authoritative actors – understood 
as bricoleurs – play with institutional settings are 
highly important.
5.3 Discussion of  the case studies
The two case studies illustrate how different as-
pects of our dialectic reading of “doing institution” 
enhances the understanding of the lives of people at 
risk in countries of the Global South. Starting point 
of both case studies are formal rules of the state 
regulating the appropriation and use of urban space. 
Both studies show that formal rules are usually not 
effective in a universalistic way throughout a state’s 
territory. Instead the implementation and enforce-
ment of state rules are highly context-specific. This 
is due to factors emphasized in our conception of 
“doing institutions”.
Institutions not only comprise regulative ele-
ments, but also a normative and a cultural cogni-
tive dimension. As such, the existence of slum set-
tlements in Delhi, India, is not only determined by 
the city’s Municipal Corporations’ Act, but is also 
a question of norms (e.g., empathy, guilt or greed) 
through which the exception to rules are legitimized. 
From this perspective, contradictory and even con-
flictive rules can be in place simultaneously, whereas 
not all can become effective at once at a time. Our 
case study illustrates that obtaining public services 
in a context of shifting rules, values and cognitive 
patterns requires skillful navigation through an in-
stitutional jungle. 
“Doing institutions” points to the importance of 
the need to decipher temporal and spatial dynamics 
of the rules of the game. The changing modes of 
regulation of street food vending in front of Dhaka’s 
Medical College Hospital during the course of one 
day is a case in point. These dynamics can only be 
revealed and comprehended by putting the focus on 
actors and their embeddedness in relational webs 
of power. As has been formulated by WeStermann 
(2007, 66), actors not only have the ability to choose 
between co-existing institutions and frames of refer-
ence, but also to strategically apply them to pursue 
their goals. As such, street food vendors’ access to 
public space in Dhaka, Bangladesh, is a question of 
governance and a multiplicity of rights and obliga-
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tions. For example, the hospital guards are part of 
bureaucratic structures of the state, informal street 
politics, socio-economic class etc. The example 
shows that actors bring operative rules in effect at 
particular places at specific times, and that the valid-
ity and practicability of institutions is subject to dif-
ferent interpretations and negotiations.
The case studies have underlined once more the 
role of the state as authority for setting rules and for 
distributing resources, which has deep consequences 
for the livelihoods of vulnerable urban populations. 
Our concept enhances the understanding of the as-
sertiveness of governmental rules. It offers a concep-
tual entry point for analyzing the multitude of actu-
alizations of state power in the everyday life of urban 
citizens (korFF and rothFuSS 2009), by shifting the 
focus from the state as a monolithic apparatus to-
ward as more disaggregated view. Emphasizing the 
constant reinterpretation and selective enforcement 
of rules by the state actors, everyday deviations from 
formal rules can be explained. 
To sum up, our understanding of “doing institu-
tions” puts great emphasis on a broad notion of in-
stitutions and moves social actors and their practices 
to the center of institutional analysis and accentuates 
the comprehension of the dialectic relation between 
institutions and social practices.
6 Going ahead in institutional research in de-
velopment geography
The elaboration of “doing institutions” has tak-
en up and put forward several threads of discussion 
within human geography, in general, and develop-
ment geography, in particular. We want to highlight 
three aspects for further consideration. 
Firstly, the ideas on “doing institutions” need to 
be read within the ongoing debate on the relation 
between structure and agency. Following dörFler 
et al.’s (2003) critique of a development geography 
that overemphasizes the agency of actors, this article 
emphasizes the role that institutions play for human 
agency. Institutions are produced and reproduced 
through the social practices of actors with differ-
ent capacities to influence those crucial rule-making 
processes which decides upon their access to goods 
and services, and which therefore structures their 
“social space of vulnerability” (WattS and Bohle 
1993). The chosen approach is sensitive to the politi-
cal struggles taking place over the right social order 
and helps to dissect how the “hidden mechanisms 
of power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) manifest 
themselves in the specific social practices of actors 
at particular places (SakdaPolrak 2010). Hence, we 
address one of the fundamental goals of social geog-
raphy (Werlen 1997, 65).
Secondly, “doing institutions” can take for-
ward the analysis of governance (cf. Schmitt 2011). 
“Getting institutions right” (Rodrik 2004, 10) is 
considered to be a crucial part of effective govern-
ance structures. Yet, the elaborations in this article 
point out that institutions are not static structures 
that can be easily technically designed (cleaver 
2002, 14). Rather, actors negotiate their relationship 
with institutions, and the state only accounts for part 
of the rules, values and cognitive patterns that actors 
refer to in their actual social practices. A view on in-
stitutions that fails to address their multidimension-
al, processual and fluid character has been shown to 
be inadequate to capture the politics and power rela-
tions inherent in the reality of everyday life. Focusing 
on “doing institutions”, in contrast, allows an analy-
sis of governance that directly takes power on board 
(zimmer 2012; etzold 2011; Schmitt 2011). At the 
same time, it shows that governance processes take 
place in a multitude of arenas. Governance analy-
sis should therefore not be reduced to an investiga-
tion of, for instance, formal policies at the supra-
national, the national or the city level, but rather 
include the very local contestations of institutional 
orders, too. With such an understanding, we suggest, 
bridges can be built to the study of discourses (cf. 
GlaSze and MattiSSek 2009), governmentality (cf. 
Foucault 1991; WattS 2003) and the everyday state 
(cf. CorBridGe et al. 2005; Dean 2010).
Last but not least, it has become clear from our 
case studies that space crucially matters in the dis-
cussion of institutions. As institutions seek to order 
social practices of actors and these actors’ bodies are 
(still) largely bound in space, institutions often ex-
plicitly refer to a specific level on the spatial scale: 
From the globe, the region, the nation-state and the 
city to the level of the factory, the neighborhood, or 
the household. Institutions set the boundaries of dis-
tinct spaces; institutions determine the ownership, 
access to and the appropriate use of these spaces; 
institutions regulate the relations between different 
places and the flows across different spatial levels; 
and the symbolic value or meaning of a particular 
place is also ascribed through institutions (cf. WattS 
2003; evertS et al. 2011). Actors can therefore never 
reach a space that is completely free from regulative 
rules, social norms or cognitive orderings. In turn, 
each arena or “governable space” (WattS 2003, 15) 
has its own history, its own logic, its power rela-
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tions and its institutional order that can be contested 
through actors’ everyday social practices. As “the 
geography of the world is not a product of nature 
but a product of the struggles between competing 
authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and 
administer space” (Ó Tuathail 1996, 1), (develop-
ment) geography is also about institutions, how they 
distribute and legitimize power, and how institutions 
are (re-)produced through human agency.
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